1 Bremner and dkg are co-hosting a BoF at debconf:
3 https://summit.debconf.org/debconf15/meeting/217/improving-privacy-and-security-for-notmuch-mail/
8 Moving parts for secure e-mail
23 * wrong key selection during composition
24 * reply (message mode defaults)
26 * webmail authentication/authorization (muliple users?)
27 * webmail message escaping (XSS, etc)
29 * terminal escape sequences
32 ### usability as security?
34 * indexing encrypted mail
35 * Memory Hole protected headers
36 * key selection indicators during compositoin
42 * based on moving part
49 -------------------------
53 One of (at least my) primary motivations for working on Notmuch is reducing my dependence on cloud services, and supporting the secure sending and receiving of signed and encrypted mail. Like any realworld piece of software, notmuch is far from perfect, and several areas related to privacy and security could clearly be improved. During this BoF we'd like to plan out some topics to work on in followup hacking sessions. Anyone is welcome, even if they don't feel like hacking on notmuch. Potential topics of discussion andhacking include:
54 * S/MIME signatures and encryption
55 * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer
56 * Searching of GPG encrypted mail
57 * Auditing and fixing "webbug" style problems in front ends
58 * Making notmuch build reproducibly
64 * S/MIME signatures and encryption
66 * integration with other keyrings
67 * signature only (easyish) versus encryption (more work)
68 * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer
69 * automated "encrypt-when-i-have-keys-available" mode or other convenience functions?
70 * can an adversary force signatures based on quoted text?
71 * generate memory-hole-style messages
72 * Searching of GPG encrypted mail
73 * possible implementation mechanism: "notmuch reindex --with-filter=decrypt"
74 * Auditing and fixing "webbug" style problems in front ends
75 * can we instruct emacs to restrict all network access from notmuch?
76 * what other frontends might call out to the network?
77 * Making notmuch build reproducibly
78 * https://reproducible.debian.net/rb-pkg/unstable/amd64/notmuch.html
79 * Protect against spoofed signature verification?
80 * how do we deal with multipart messages where only a subtree is signed?
81 * are other sorts of spoofing possible?
82 * read and display memory-hole-style messages
83 * "safe" ways to display html parts (e.g. without text/plain alternatives)