Security and privacy concerns
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-* privacy leaks rendering messages
* message-id collisions
+* rendering "rich" messages
+ * network access in front ends
+ * safe rendering of HTML
+* rendering security information
+ * spoofing signatures
+ * partially signed messages
* Oops I just sent...
* wrong key selection during composition
* reply (message mode defaults)
* opportunistic signing and encryption
+ * using markup for security
* inline PGP
* webmail
* authentication/authorization (multiple users?)
Usability as security?
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-* indexing encrypted mail
+* Indexing encrypted mail
+ * incremental re-indexing?
* Memory Hole protected headers
-* key selection indicators during composition
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+* Key selection indicators during composition
Breakout sessions
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-more complete agenda:
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- * signature only (easyish) versus encryption (more work)
- * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer
- * automated "encrypt-when-i-have-keys-available" mode or other convenience functions?
- * can an adversary force signatures based on quoted text?
- * generate memory-hole-style messages
- * Searching of GPG encrypted mail
- * possible implementation mechanism: "notmuch reindex --with-filter=decrypt"
- * Auditing and fixing "webbug" style problems in front ends
- * can we instruct emacs to restrict all network access from notmuch?
- * what other frontends might call out to the network?
- * Making notmuch build reproducibly
- * https://reproducible.debian.net/rb-pkg/unstable/amd64/notmuch.html
- * Protect against spoofed signature verification?
- * how do we deal with multipart messages where only a subtree is signed?
- * are other sorts of spoofing possible?
- * read and display memory-hole-style messages
- * "safe" ways to display html parts (e.g. without text/plain alternatives)
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