X-Git-Url: https://git.cworth.org/git?a=blobdiff_plain;f=meetings%2Fhd2015.mdwn;h=706235602d0898faba0b2580d4a91e115020f3bc;hb=43f0b1e82ee56387330ee084ab161bced8300438;hp=3fa467963b110ae30e153f77f668d1f7131355f1;hpb=681d43d740499f9064e2ddf53374c5d318a7e6fd;p=notmuch-wiki diff --git a/meetings/hd2015.mdwn b/meetings/hd2015.mdwn index 3fa4679..7062356 100644 --- a/meetings/hd2015.mdwn +++ b/meetings/hd2015.mdwn @@ -20,32 +20,40 @@ Moving parts for secure e-mail * GnuPG (C) * Emacs UI (emacs lisp) * notmuch-emacs - * mml-mode + * mml-mode, mm multimedia rendering library * Alot / nmbug / nmbug-status (python) * python-bindings * webmail: * noservice (Clojure) * notmuch web (Haskell) -Security concerns ------------------ -* wrong key selection during composition -* reply (message mode defaults) -* inline PGP +Security and privacy concerns +----------------------------- +* privacy leaks rendering messages * message-id collisions -* webmail authentication/authorization (muliple users?) -* webmail message escaping (XSS, etc) +* Oops I just sent... + * wrong key selection during composition + * reply (message mode defaults) + * opportunistic signing and encryption +* inline PGP +* webmail + * authentication/authorization (multiple users?) + * message escaping (XSS, etc) * shell injection * terminal escape sequences * S/MIME support + * signatures + * encryption + * integration with other keyrings * reproducible builds: [sphinx man pages](https://reproducible.debian.net/rb-pkg/testing/amd64/notmuch.html) -### usability as security? +Usability as security? +---------------------- * indexing encrypted mail * Memory Hole protected headers -* key selection indicators during compositoin +* key selection indicators during composition Breakout sessions @@ -60,18 +68,9 @@ Reportbacks ------------------------- -proposed session: ---------- - * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer - * Searching of GPG encrypted mail - * Auditing and fixing "webbug" style problems in front ends ---------- more complete agenda: - * S/MIME signatures and encryption - * test suites - * integration with other keyrings * signature only (easyish) versus encryption (more work) * Improving the security of the Emacs MML mime composer * automated "encrypt-when-i-have-keys-available" mode or other convenience functions?